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ABSTRACT
Why do firm growth and exit rates decline with size? What determines the size distribution of
firms? This paper presents a theory of firm dynamics that simultaneously rationalizes the basic
facts on firm growth, exit, and size distributions. The theory emphasizes the accumulation of
industry specific human capital in response to industry specific productivity shocks. The theory
implies that firm growth and exit rates should decline faster with size, and the size distribution
should have thinner tails, in sectors that use human capital less intensively, or correspondingly,
physical capital more intensively. In line with the theory, we document substantial sectoral
heterogeneity in US firm dynamics and firm size distributions, which is well explained by

















Why do ﬁrm growth and exit rates decline with size? What determines
the size distribution of ﬁrms? This paper presents a theory of ﬁrm dynamics
that simultaneously rationalizes the basic facts on ﬁrm growth, exit, and size
distributions. The theory emphasizes the accumulation of industry speciﬁc
human capital in response to industry speciﬁc productivity shocks. The theory
implies that ﬁrm growth and exit rates should decline faster with size, and the
size distribution should have thinner tails, in sectors that use human capital
less intensively, or correspondingly, physical capital more intensively. In line
with the theory, we document substantial sectoral heterogeneity in US ﬁrm
dynamics and ﬁrm size distributions, which is well explained by variation in
physical capital intensities.
1. INTRODUCTION
Firm sizes dynamics are scale dependent:s m a l lﬁrms grow faster than large ﬁrms
a n de x i tr a t e sd e c l i n ew i t hs i z e . S c a l ed e p e n d e n c ei ng r o w t ha n de x i tr a t e si sa l s o
systematically reﬂected in the size distribution of ﬁrms. In this paper we propose
an explanation of this scale dependence that relies on the response of production
∗We thank Liran Einav, Bob Hall, Boyan Jovanovic, Pete Klenow, Narayana Kocherlakota and
numerous seminar participants for helpful comments, Tim Bresnahan and CEEG for ﬁnancial sup-
port, Trey Cole of the US Census Bureau for his help in constructing the database, and Adam
Cagliarini for outstanding research assistance.
1decisions to the allocation and accumulation of industry speciﬁch u m a nc a p i t a l .O u r
theory can simultaneously rationalize the facts on growth and exit rates as well as
the size distribution of ﬁrms. In addition, the theory implies that diﬀerences in the
importance of industry speciﬁc human capital, and therefore also physical capital,
across sectors should lead to cross-sectoral variation in the degree of scale dependence
within a sector. We present evidence from a new data-set to document these facts
for the US economy. We ﬁnd that, as implied by our theory, US sectors with larger
physical capital shares exhibit signiﬁcantly more scale dependence in ﬁrms dynamics
and size distributions.
A large literature beginning with Gibrat (1931) has examined the size distribution
of ﬁrms. Figure 1 illustrates what we mean by scale dependence in the size distribution
of ﬁrms by comparing the densities of establishment sizes (employment at operations
at a single location) and enterprises (employment at operations under common own-
ership or control) for the US economy in 2000 to a commonly used benchmark: a
Pareto distribution with shape coeﬃcient one (see, for example, Axtell (2001)). The
Pareto distribution is scale independent in the sense that the distribution is invariant
to truncation of the left tail. The ﬁgure shows that the enterprise and establishment
size distributions are similar, reﬂecting the fact that only the very largest enterprises
possess more than a single establishment. Importantly, both distributions have thin-
ner tails than the Pareto benchmark: there is scale dependence in the size distribution
of ﬁrms. In Figure 2, we present these data in a diﬀe r e n tf o r m a ti no r d e rt oe m p h a s i z e
the right tail of the distribution. If production units are distributed according to a
Pareto distribution, the logarithm of the share of production units greater than a
particular employment size varies linearly with the logarithm of employment. If the
Pareto distribution has a shape coeﬃcient of one, the slope of the line is minus one.
If, however, the tails of the actual distribution are thinner than the tails of a Pareto
distribution, as in Figure 1, the relationship is concave and not linear.1
We interpret the similarity between both curves in Figure 2 as evidence that the
1In Figure 2 one can see that the distributions of enterprises and establishments are similar
for units with less than 400 employees reﬂecting the fact that most enterprises are formed by one
establishment. The curve for establishments is clearly concave, as is the one for enterprises although
at a larger scale. The latter ﬁnding is surprising in light of the commonly held view that the
distribution of enterprises is well described by a Pareto distribution with coeﬃcient one.
2same economic forces determine the size of establishment and enterprises. In Figure
2 we include data for enterprises with close to one million employees to highlight the
previous statement. Hence, in what follows, we suppress the distinction and refer to
production units simply as ﬁrms. Nevertheless, the theory we develop below refers to
the technology of a single production unit and does not address questions of ownership
or control. Consequently throughout the paper we focus solely on establishment data.
Figure 1: 




























































Firm dynamics are also scale dependent. For example, it is well-known that small
ﬁrms grow faster than large ﬁrms, at least when attention is restricted to those ﬁrms
that remain in operation.2 This is illustrated in Figure 3 which plots growth rates
by ﬁrm size for the US over both one and ten year intervals. This ﬁgure shows that
the diﬀerence in growth rates between small and large ﬁrms can be as large as twenty
per-cent within a year, and that the accumulated eﬀect of this pattern over a decade
leads to diﬀerences of more than one-hundred per-cent between small and large ﬁrms.
2This fact was most forcefully demonstrated by Mansﬁeld (1962) in his study of ﬁrms in the steel,
petroleum, tire and automobile industries. More recent work by Hall (1987) and Evans (1987a,b)
using data on ﬁrms, and by Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1989a,b) on manufacturing plants, has
conﬁrmed this ﬁnding. See also the surveys by Scherer 1980, Geroski 1995, Sutton 1997, and Caves
1998, who document the robustness of these results across time, industries and countries.
3Moreover, this scale dependence in growth rates is not limited to the smallest ﬁrms,
and is signiﬁcant throughout the size distribution.
In a typical period, a substantial fraction of production units turn over: some units
exit, while new ones are created. Mansﬁeld (1962) was one of the ﬁrst to emphasize
the importance of turnover and to ﬁnd scale dependence in exit rates: small ﬁrms are
more likely to exit than large ﬁrms. This scale dependence in exit rates is illustrated
in Figure 4 which follows the cohort of ﬁrms that exited between 1995 and 1996 in
the years leading up to their death. Several features in this ﬁgure should be noted.
First, exit rates decline substantially with size, even for ﬁr m sw i t hm o r et h a n1 0 0 0
employees. Second, there is no evidence of the “Shadow of Death”: ﬁrms declining
in size in the years leading up to their death (Griliches and Regev 1995). There is,
however, strong evidence that recent entrants have higher exit rates as illustrated by
the increased mass of small ﬁrms as they approach their exit date. This suggests that
selection is important for small young ﬁrms, but not for medium and large ones.





















































Exit year - 1
Exit year - 3
Figures 1 through 4 illustrate the scale dependence in ﬁrm dynamics and size dis-
tributions for the US over the 1990s. However, scale dependence has also been doc-
umented over diﬀerent time periods, sectors, and countries. This is surprising given
4the enormous diversity of institutions, market structures, and technology. The ro-
bustness of these facts demands a theory that emphasizes forces common to a variety
of circumstances and sectors. Moreover, it requires a theory where these facts survive
aggregation and are consistent with aggregate evidence.
To address these facts, we propose an aggregate theory of ﬁrm dynamics based on
the accumulation of industry speciﬁc human capital. We present a stochastic growth
model with multiple goods. The set of goods in the economy is divided into sub-
groups that we call sectors. Each sector is in turn formed by a collection of goods that
we call industries. Firms operate in only one industry and hire labor and industry
speciﬁc human and physical capital. As long as technology exhibits diminishing
returns to human capital at the ﬁrm level, and this is preserved by aggregation within
an industry, an abundance of human capital leads to low rates of return and slower
accumulation of human capital. Conversely, if the stock of the human capital is
relatively low, rates of return are high and accumulation is fast. This process, which
is at the heart of the resource allocation mechanism in the economy, leads to mean
reversion in the stock of industry speciﬁc human capital. As long as ﬁrms respond
monotonically to ﬂuctuations in factor prices driven by the stock of human capital,
mean reversion in these stocks leads to mean reversion in ﬁrm sizes. This results in
small ﬁrms growing faster than large ﬁrms.
T h es a m ep r o c e s sa l s oi m p l i e st h a te x i tr a t e sd e c l i n ew i t hs i z e . T os e et h i s ,n o t e
that, given the level of employment in the industry, increases in average ﬁrm sizes
imply that some ﬁrms exit. The extent to which employment in the industry varies
depends on the degree of substitutability in consumption determined by preferences.
As long as the degree of substitutability is not too large, employment at the industry
level does not increase enough to oﬀset the larger ﬁrm sizes, and ﬁrms exit. Since
small ﬁrms grow faster than large ﬁr m s ,t h ee x i tr a t ei sl a r g e s tf o rs m a l lﬁrms: scale
dependence in exit rates. We can then combine the implications of the model for
growth and exit to show that in the long run the distribution of ﬁrm sizes in a
sector converges to an invariant distribution that has thinner tails than the Pareto
distribution with coeﬃcient one.
The driving force behind all of these results is the accumulation of industry speciﬁc
human capital. As a result, the mechanism is robust to a variety of diﬀerent environ-
5ments. To establish this, we also consider diﬀerent production technologies, within
industry ﬁrm heterogeneity, alternative mechanisms for the accumulation of human
capital such as learning by doing, and diﬀerences in the form of product market
competition.
The emphasis on the accumulation and allocation of speciﬁc human capital implies
that ﬁrm growth and exit rates should decline faster with size in sectors that use hu-
man capital less intensively. In turn, this implies that the tails of the size distribution
of ﬁrms should be thinner the smaller the human capital share. The rate of accumu-
lation of industry speciﬁc human capital is tied to industry production either because
the same factors of production are used to generate new industry speciﬁck n o w l e d g e ,
o rb e c a u s ep a s tp r o d u c t i o na ﬀect the stock of this knowledge directly through learn-
ing by doing. The elasticity of factor prices to factor stocks is positively related to the
share of the factor in production. These prices in turn determine the accumulation
of industry speciﬁc factors and therefore the degree of mean reversion. Hence, the
degree of mean reversion decreases with human capital intensity, just as in the neo-
classical growth model the speed of convergence decreases with the physical capital
share. Unlike human capital, physical capital investments are tied to production in
a wide variety of sectors that diﬀuses this mechanism. We show that the process of
entry and exit of ﬁrms ensures that industry production will display constant returns
to scale, and so physical capital intensities are negatively related to human capital
intensities. This implies that the intensity of physical capital in production is pos-
itively related to the degree of mean reversion in human capital and, hence, to the
degree of mean reversion in ﬁrm sizes.
We assess the relationship between capital shares and ﬁrm scale dependence using
a new data-set commissioned from the US Census Bureau on ﬁrm growth and exit
rates, as well as ﬁrm size distributions, for very ﬁne size categories and 2 digit SIC
sectors. We ﬁr s tt e s tt h ei m p l i c a t i o no ng r o w t hr a t e sa n ds h o wt h a t ,a sp r e d i c t e db y
the theory, there is a positive and signiﬁcant relationship between scale dependence
in growth rates and physical capital shares. We then proceed to show that this
same relationship is reﬂe c t e di ne x i tr a t e sa n di ns i g n i ﬁcant diﬀerences in the size
distribution of ﬁr m sa c r o s ss e c t o r s .T h ed i ﬀerences are large. For example, in order
to make the size distribution of ﬁrms in the physical capital intensive manufacturing
6sector conform to the size distribution of ﬁrms in the labor intensive educational
services sector, we would need to take roughly three million employees (about twenty
per-cent of total manufacturing employment) from medium size manufacturing ﬁrms
(between 50 and 1000 employees), and reallocate two million to very large ﬁrms and
one million to very small ﬁrms. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study
to make use of detailed ﬁrm size data for the entire non-farm private sector. This
allows us to uncover these novel empirical regularities predicted by our theory.3
In contrast to our approach, most recent theoretical attempts to explain the size
distribution of ﬁrms have focused on particular dimensions of the dynamics of ﬁrms in
an industry assuming elastically supplied factors of production. Another characteris-
tic of most of these frameworks is that they generate scale dependence via selection
mechanisms: unsuccessful ﬁrms decline and exit. In Jovanovic (1982), this selection
occurs as ﬁrms learn about their productivity, while in Hopenhayn (1992), Ericson
and Pakes (1995) and Luttmer (2004) a sequence of bad productivity shocks leads
ﬁrms to exit. In Kortum and Klette (2003), it occurs as ﬁrms add and subtract
product lines in response to their own and competitors’ investments in research and
development. We acknowledge that these type of eﬀects may be important for small
ﬁrms, but we believe that they may be less relevant for the scale dependence observed
across medium sized and large ﬁrms.
Another mechanism that has its main impact on small ﬁrms is the presence of im-
perfections in ﬁnancial markets as in Cabral and Mata (2003), Clementi and Hopen-
hayn (2002), Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2002) and Cooley and Quadrini (2001).
Cabral and Mata (2003) present evidence that the size distribution of a cohort of sur-
viving ﬁrms shifts to the right and approaches a log-normal distribution over time.
They read this as support for the existence of ﬁnancial constraints on small ﬁrms.
However, our model is also consistent with this ﬁnding. Since small ﬁrms grow faster
than large ﬁrms, and enter more in absolute terms, following a cohort of surviving
3Relatively little work has examined cross-industry diﬀerences in ﬁrm sizes. In terms of ﬁrm
growth rates, Audretsch et al (2002) found that Gibrat’s Law is a better approximation for the
Dutch services sector than it is for the manufacturing sector. In terms of entry and exit, Geroski
(1983) found that gross entry and exit rates of ﬁrms are positively correlated across industries, while
Geroski and Schwalbach (1991) found that turnover rankings were common across countries. Orr
(1974), Gorecki (1976), Hause and Du Rietz (1984) and MacDonald (1986) all found that ﬁrm exit
rates were negatively related to measures of physical capital intensity by industry.
7ﬁrms over time results in distributions where the mass of ﬁr m ss h i f t st ot h er i g h t .
As emphasized by Cooley and Quadrini (2001) both age and size eﬀects are indepen-
dently important; we focus mostly on the latter. Other models, for example Lucas
(1978) and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2004), produce a size distribution for ﬁrms
that inherits the properties of the distribution of managerial ability in the population.
In contrast to all of these mechanisms, our model focuses upon the speciﬁcity of
human capital in an industry. Many of the mechanisms in the literature undoubtedly
contribute towards an explanation of ﬁrm dynamics. This paper shows, we believe,
that the accumulation of industry speciﬁc human capital matters too.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops our theory in
detail for the case in which ﬁrms act competitively and derives the key empirical
predictions of our theory. A number of extensions, designed to show the robustness
of our mechanism and its predictions to changes in the institutional environment, are
presented in Section 3, along with a discussion of this link between our theory and
the empirical work on speciﬁc human capital by Kambourov and Manovskii (2002).
Section 4 describes our data, and presents results that show that ﬁrm growth and
exit rates, as well as the ﬁrm size distribution, vary with physical capital shares in
precisely the way predicted by our theory. Section 5 concludes.
2. THE MODEL
We present a stochastic dynamic aggregate model in which ﬁrms are perfectly
competitive. Labor is mobile across all industries, while both physical and human
capital are speciﬁct oe a c hi n d u s t r y .T h em o d e lo ft h eﬁrm is standard: ﬁxed costs
plus increasing marginal costs of production imply a U-shaped average cost curve,
w h i l ef r e ee n t r ya n de x i to fﬁrms ensures that all ﬁr m si na ni n d u s t r yo p e r a t ea tt h e
bottom of their average cost curves. As the focus is upon the allocation of factors
across ﬁr m sa n di n d u s t r i e s ,t h ed e m a n ds i d eo ft h em o d e li sk e p ta ss i m p l ea sp o s s i b l e
by assuming logarithmic preferences. This assumption, combined with Cobb-Douglas
production functions and log-linear depreciation, ensures that we are able to solve
the entire model in closed form.
82.1 Households
The economy is populated by a unit measure of identical small households. At
the beginning of time, the household has N0 members, and over time the number of
members of the household Nt grows exogenously at rate gN. Households do not value
leisure and order their preferences over state contingent consumption streams {Ct}












where δ is the discount factor of the household, and E0 is an expectation operator
conditioned on information available to the household at the beginning of time. This
function reﬂe c t st h ef a c tt h a ta ta n yp o i n ti nt i m e ,e a c ho ft h eNt members of the
household consumes an equal share of the households consumption bundle, and that
t h eh o u s e h o l da saw h o l es u m st h ev a l u a t i o n so fe a c ho fi t sm e m b e r s .
The household produces the ﬁnal good by combining quantities of J diﬀerent inter-









The ﬁnal good can be used for consumption, as well as for investment in physical
c a p i t a li ne a c ho ft h eJ intermediate good industries Xtj. We distinguish these inter-
mediates by what we refer to as a sector and an industry. In particular, we assume
that there are S sectors in this economy, and that each sector contains Js industries,
where s =1 ,...,S. Each industry produces a single distinct good so that there are
J = ΣS
s=1Js goods being produced in this economy. Sectors diﬀe ra c c o r d i n gt ot h e
methods by which output is produced and factors are accumulated; within a sector,
the parameters governing production and accumulation of factors for each industry
are the same. We also assume that each industry within a sector has the same share
in production of the ﬁnal good so that θj = θi for all i,j in sector s. Importantly,
each industry within a sector receives its own productivity shock and accumulates its
own stocks of human and physical capital. This is important below: because each
industry within a sector evolves separately, according to a process governed by the
9same parameters, we will be able to characterize the invariant distribution of ﬁrm
sizes within each sector. In thinking about the data, we deﬁne our sectors to be
roughly comparable to the list of 3 digit NAICS classiﬁcations, while our industries
map into NAICS industries at a much ﬁner level of disaggregation.
In each period, each member of the household is endowed with one unit of time
which the household can allocate to work in any one of the J industries, so that if we
denote by Ntj t h ea m o u n to ft i m ew o r k e di ni n d u s t r yj, we have
J X
j=1
Ntj ≤ Nt. (3)
Households also rent out their stocks of each of the J industry-speciﬁc physical and
human capital stocks, which we denote by Ktj and Htj respectively. Physical capital






This log-linear form for physical capital accumulation has grown increasingly popular
as a device for modelling adjustment of physical capital while still admitting closed
form solutions. Here λj captures the importance of past physical capital stocks to
t h ea m o u n to fc a p i t a ln e x tp e r i o d :i fλj is one, capital does not evolve and is a ﬁxed
factor; if λj is zero, physical capital depreciates fully each period.











a n di sd e s i g n e dt oc a p t u r et h er a n d o ma c c u m u l a t i o nw i t h i na n
industry, while Itj is an investment in human capital accumulation. These industry
speciﬁc productivity shocks are the only source of randomness in our model.
We assume that Itj is denominated in terms of the output of the industry itself,
in order to capture the idea that industry speciﬁcl e a r n i n gr e q u i r e ss o m ei n d u s t r y
speciﬁc inputs, so that the resource constraint for output of industry j, Ytj, is
Qtj + Itj = Ytj.
10In our framework there are no externalities: Human capital investments are paid by
households, and they rent the new human capital for use in production. In Section 3,
below, we also present an extension of the model which allows for learning-by-doing
externalities and show that it has similar properties. Moreover, with learning-by-
doing externalities, households do not appropriate the rewards to industry-speciﬁc
learning, which is consistent with empirical evidence on industry speciﬁc human cap-
ital (for example, Kambourov and Manovskii 2002). The assumption that human
capital accumulation responds to industry-speciﬁc production levels is essential for
our results as it will serve as the primary source of industry speciﬁc mean reversion.
Finally, as noted above, we assume that the accumulation parameters are identical
across all industries within a sector; that is, ωj = ωi and λj = λi for all i,j in sector
s. The household begins with initial stocks of these speciﬁc factors denoted by K0j
and H0j.
2.2 Firms
Production within each industry takes place in production units that we call ﬁrms.
To begin, for simplicity, we abstract from ﬁrm speciﬁc heterogeneity and assume that
each ﬁrm in industry j at time t has access to the same production technology; we
relax this assumption in Section 3 below. To produce in a period, the ﬁrm must pay a
ﬁxed cost Fj that period. Once the ﬁxed cost has been paid, the ﬁrm hires industry-
j-speciﬁc physical capital ktj, in combination with an industry-j-speciﬁcl a b o ri n p u t
that is, in turn, produced by combining raw labor ntj with industry-j-speciﬁch u m a n















Here γj < 1 captures the extent of decreasing returns to production which, in com-
bination with the ﬁxed cost, ensures that average costs are “U-shaped” and serves
to pin down the size of the ﬁrm. The parameter αj governs the share of physical
capital in value added, while βj captures the share of human capital in the labor
aggregate. Both production parameters and the process governing evolution of the
productivity shock are assumed to be common across all industries within a sector:
αj = αi, βj = βi and γj = γi for all i,j in sector s.
11None of our results depend upon the denomination of the ﬁxed cost, and so to
begin we assume that it is denom i n a t e di nt h eu n i t so ft h eﬁrms output. This has the
expositional advantage of pinning down the scale of production of the plant (measured
in terms of output), so that we can easily analyze the eﬀects of changes in factor prices
o nt h es i z eo ft h eﬁrm (measured in terms of the number of employees); we return to
this assumption below.
2.3 Capital accumulation and labor allocation
To complete the characterization of the evolution of ﬁrm sizes in this economy,
all that is necessary is to characterize the evolution of productivity and factors in
equilibrium. If we allow for a non-integer number of ﬁrms, this economy satisﬁes
all of the assumptions of the welfare theorems. As we are primarily interested in
allocations, and not prices, we proceed by solving the Social Planning Problem for this
economy: Choose state contingent sequences
©
Ctj,X tj,I tj,N tj,µ tj,H tj,K tj
ª∞,J
t=0,j=1 so





































tj − Fjµtj, (8)


















for all dates and states.
Inspection of this problem reveals that the choice of the number of ﬁrms is entirely
static: µtj only appears in the resource constraint for industry j at time t. This implies
that we can ﬁrst solve for the optimal number of ﬁrms before solving for the dynamics
































































If the stock of speciﬁc factors is high relative to the amount of labor employed in
the industry (which corresponds to the case of relatively cheap speciﬁc factor prices),
ﬁrms size measured in terms of the number of employees will be small. Similarly,
m e a nr e v e r s i o ni nt h es t o c ko fr e l a t i v es p e c i ﬁc factor stocks will drive mean reversion
in ﬁrm sizes. Importantly, the qualitative nature of the relationship between factor
stocks and ﬁrm size can be reversed, without changing the result that mean reversion
in these stocks produces mean reversion in ﬁrms sizes. In the next section, we show
that the incentive to accumulate produces precisely the required mean reversion in
the general equilibrium of our model.
Substituting for the optimal number of ﬁrms into the resource constraint gives

















13This is our ﬁrst main result: by varying the number of ﬁrms, each of which produces
at the bottom of its average cost curve, the industry behaves as though it has constant
returns to scale.
The result is an entirely standard log-linear multi-sector growth model with a new
constant returns to scale production function.4 As a result of the log-linear assump-
tions, we get the well-known result (see, for example, the appendix to Rossi-Hansberg
and Wright (2004a)) that income and substitution eﬀects oﬀset to ensure that a ﬁxed
proportion of the labor supply is allocated to each industry, a ﬁxed proportion of the
ﬁnal good is consumed, while ﬁxed proportions are invested in each industry, and a
ﬁxed proportion of the output of each intermediate input is used for investment in
human capital speciﬁc to that industry.
2.4 Implications for Firm Growth, Exit, and the Firm Size Distribution
With these results in hand, we can now characterize the evolution of ﬁrm sizes in
the economy. Taking natural logarithms and diﬀerences of the expression for ﬁrm size
(12) we ﬁnd that the growth rate of a ﬁrm in industry j is given by
lnnt+1j − lnntj =
¡
αj + βj (1 − αj)
¢
gN − αj [lnKt+1j − lnKtj]
−βj (1 − αj)[lnHt+1j − lnHtj],
and substituting for the evolution of human capital we get
lnnt+1j − lnntj =
¡
αj + βj (1 − αj)
¢
gN − αj [lnKt+1j − lnKtj]
−βj (1 − αj)[lnAt+1j +( ωj − 1)lnHtj +( 1− ωj)Itj].
This equation reveals that the growth rate of a ﬁrm in industry j is driven by
three factors. The ﬁrst is the deterministic growth in the aggregate labor supply
gN which, other things equal, encourages ﬁrms to expand in size over time. We will
often assume that either population growth is zero, or that ﬁrms growth rates are
being measured relative to trend, in order to abstract from this term. The second
factor is the growth in industry speciﬁc physical capital. However, as physical capital
4In a related paper Jones (2004) shows how a Pareto size distribution of ﬁrms leads to an aggregate
Cobb-Douglas production function.
14investment in each industry is a constant proportion of the aggregate production of
the ﬁnal good, this is also determined by aggregate forces. Over time, if the number of
industries is large so that industry-speciﬁc randomness washes out in the aggregate,
t h ea g g r e g a t ee c o n o m yc o n v e r g e st oaas t e a d ys t a t ea n dt h i st e r mw i l lb eac o n s t a n t .
In what follows we assume this is the case in order to focus on industry speciﬁc
variation; in general, the results that follow can be thought of as being conditioned
upon the state of the aggregate economy. Finally, we have the contribution of industry
speciﬁc variability, which works through the shock to human capital accumulation,
and the level of industry output which aﬀects human capital accumulation through
Itj: if industry output is high, human capital accumulation proceeds, on average, at
a faster pace.
Before turning to a discussion of scale dependence in growth rates, it is useful to
begin by examining the conditions under which we get scale independent growth or,
in other words, the conditions under which we get Gibrat’s Law. First, suppose we
eliminate human capital as a factor of production by either reducing the importance
of labor as a whole (that is, reducing (1 − αj)) or reducing the importance of human
capital in producing labor services (that is, reducing βj). In this case, the ﬁrm grows
at a deterministic rate that is independent of scale. This is due to the fact that the
only source of industry-speciﬁc randomness comes from shock to the accumulation
of human capital.5 Second, suppose that human capital is accumulated exogenously,
or that ωj =1:this ensures that output in an industry has no eﬀect on the pace of
its human capital accumulation.6 With the aggregate economy in steady state, the
growth rate of the ﬁrm becomes
lnnt+1j − lnntj =
¡
αj + βj (1 − αj)
¢
gN − βj (1 − αj)lnAt+1j,
which is a constant plus an i.i.d. random variable: the growth rate of the ﬁrm is
5One way to retain randomness in production while still eliminating human capital as a factor
is to scale up the shock to human capital by the inverse of the elasticity of human capital in
production βj (1 − αj). I nt h i sc a s e ,t h eg r o w t hr a t eo ft h eﬁrm also satisﬁes Gibrat’s Law and
becomes lnnt+1j − lnntj = αjgN − ln ˆ At+1j, where ˆ At+1j is the scaled shock process.
6If ωj =1 , human capital in industry j, and consequently also output, is diﬀerence stationary. If
industry j is of positive measure, the aggregate physical capital stock will not in general converge
to a steady state under this assumption. As long as 1 − ωj is positive, no matter how small, the
existence of a steady state is preserved. When we refer to the case of ωj =1below, we shall think
of 1 − ωj arbitrarily small but positive.
15independent of the size of the ﬁrm.
To see how ﬁrm growth rates depend upon ﬁrm size in general, assume as before
that population growth is zero and that the aggregate economy is in steady state
so that physical capital is constant in all industries. Then using equation (12) the
growth rate of the ﬁrm, after substituting for Itj, can be written as
lnnt+1j − lnntj = n
C − (1 − ωj)
¡
1 − βj + αjβj
¢
lnntj − βj (1 − αj)lnAt+1j, (13)
where nC is a constant term that depends on the physical capital stock. We summarize
the results of this discussion in the following proposition in which we emphasize the
eﬀect of changes in physical capital intensity, an observable parameter which we focus
upon in our empirical analysis.
Proposition 1 Firm growth rates are weakly decreasing in size. The higher is the
physical capital share, the faster growth rates decline with size. The growth rate of
ﬁrms is independent of its size only if either human capital is not a factor of production
(in the limit as βj or (1 − αj) are equal to 0), or human capital evolves exogenously
(in the limit as ωj approaches one).
T h el o g - l i n e a r i t yo ft h em o d e lw a ss h o w na b o v et oi m p l yt h a tt h ee m p l o y m e n t
allocation across industries was constant over time. Combined with the result of the
above proposition, this has strong implications on exit rates: there is exit whenever
ﬁrm sizes grow on average. In a more general model in which the labor allocation
varies in equilibrium this result continues to hold as long as the elasticity of substi-
tution in consumption of each good is not too large. This is suﬃcient to guarantee
that the labor allocation to the industry does not change by as much as ﬁrm sizes.
Moreover, the above proposition implies that the higher the physical capital share,
the faster the exit rate decreases with ﬁrm size.
Corollary 2 Firm exit rates are weakly decreasing in size. The higher is the physical
capital share, the faster exit rates decline with size. The exit rate of ﬁr m si si n d e p e n -
dent of size only if either human capital is not a factor of production (in the limit as
βj or (1 − αj) are equal to 0), or human capital evolves exogenously (in the limit as
ωj approaches one).
16These implications for the relationship between physical capital shares, ﬁrm growth
rates and exit can be tested directly using longitudinal data. In combination with
the assumption that the distribution of ﬁrm sizes has converged to its long-run dis-
tribution, we can also test this implication with data on the size distribution of ﬁrms.
Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2004) showed that the combination of scale independent
growth for a ﬁnite number of industries, combined with this form of entry and exit,
is suﬃcient to generate an invariant distribution that satisﬁed Zipf’s law: the size
distribution is Pareto with coeﬃcient one. Away from these limits, when there is
mean reversion in ﬁrm growth rates, it can be established that there exists a unique
invariant distribution that has thinner tails than implied by Zipf’s Law: there is a
relative absence of very small, and very large, ﬁrms. We can also establish that the
tails of the size distribution become thinner as physical capital shares increase. These
claims are proven in the following three propositions.
Proposition 3 (Zipf’s Law) If either human capital is not a factor of production (in
the limit as βj or (1 − αj) are equal to 0), or human capital evolves exogenously (in
the limit as ωj approaches one), the size distribution of ﬁrms converges to a Pareto
distribution with shape coeﬃcient one.
Proof. See Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2004) Proposition 4.
Outside of these special cases, we can also characterize the invariant distribution of
ﬁrm sizes. We begin by establishing the existence of a unique invariant distribution.
The proof of the following proposition requires compactness of the space of ﬁrm sizes





for some A suitably small and A suitably large, and that
ﬁrm sizes are measured relative to trend (or equivalently that population growth is
zero). These assumptions imply that
lnntj ∈ LN ≡
βj (1 − αj)
(1 − ωj)
¡






Proposition 4 For any αj,βj,ωj ∈ (0,1), there exists a unique invariant distribu-
tion over ﬁrm sizes in sector j.
17Proof. The proof is independent for each sector so we drop j from the notation. The
size of a ﬁrm at time t +1is given by
lnnt+1 = g(nt,A t+1) ≡−lnAt+1 +
¡
1 − (1 − ωj)
¡
1 − βj (1 − αj)
¢¢
lnnt,
w h e r ew eh a v ea s s u m e st h a tt h ep o p u l a t i o ns i z ei sﬁxed (alternatively, we could work
with variations from trend). This lies in the compact set LN deﬁned above. Let µ
be the probability measure over A. Then, the probability of a transition from a point
n to a set S is given by
Q(n,S)=µ(A : g(n,A) ∈ S).










Deﬁne also the operator T∗, that maps the probability of being in a set S next period






Since the set LN is compact, we are able to use Theorem 12.12 in Stokey, Lucas
and Prescott (1989) to prove that there exists a unique invariant distribution, if we
can show that the transition probability function Q satisﬁes the Feller property, is
monotone, and satisﬁes the mixing condition.
To see that it satisﬁes the Feller Property, note that the function g is continuous
in lnn,a n dlnA.S i n c eg is continuous and bounded, if f is continuous and bounded,
f (g(·)) will be continuous and bounded and therefore so is Tf.H e n c e T maps the
space of bounded continuous functions into itself, T : C(¯ S) → C(¯ S).T o s e e t h a t
it is monotone, we need to prove that if f : LN → R is a non-decreasing function,
then so is Tf.B u tt h i sf o l l o w sf r o mt h ef a c tt h a tt h eg is non-decreasing in n. Hence
f (g(n,A)) is non-decreasing in n and therefore so is Tf.
Finally, to show that it satisﬁes the mixing condition, we need to show that there
exists c ∈ LN and η>0 such that
Q
Ã
−lnAβj (1 − αj)
(1 − ωj)
¡




−lnAβj (1 − αj)
(1 − ωj)
¡







−lnAβj (1 − αj)
(1 − ωj)
¡
1 − βj (1 − αj)
¢,
"
−lnAβj (1 − αj)
(1 − ωj)
¡




Let c =0 . As g is continuous and decreasing in A,t h e r ee x i s t sa nA0 such that for
all A ≤ A0, g(n,A) > 0.L e t η0 =1− µ(A0). Similarly there exists an A00 such
that for all ε ≤ A00, g(n,A) < 0. Let η00 =1− µ(A00). Call the minimum of these
probabilities η.Then c =0and η guarantee that the mixing condition holds. Theorem
12.12 in Stokey, Lucas and Prescott (1989) then guarantees that there exists a unique
invariant distribution, and that the iterates of T∗ converge weakly to that invariant
distribution.
For any αj,βj,ω j ∈ (0,1), we have established that the invariant distribution of
ﬁrms sizes has thinner tails than the Pareto distribution with coeﬃcient one. More-
over, we can order distributions in terms of the thinness of their tails, and can show
that industries with higher physical capital shares have thinner tails. This will be
useful below when we contrast the size distributions of ﬁr m si ni n d u s t r i e sw i t hd i ﬀer-
ent physical capital shares. We make these notions precise in the following deﬁnition
and proposition.




. The probability measure




such that for all b ≤ x ≤ x,
λ([b,x]) ≤ ψ([b,x]), for all x ≤ x ≤ x, λ([x,x]) ≥ ψ([x,x]),a n df o ra l lx ≤ x ≤ b,
λ([x,x]) ≤ ψ([x,x]).
In order to apply this deﬁnition, we need to standardize the support of the size dis-
tributions produced by our model. This is also necessary to contrast the implications
of our model with the data where the size categories are the same for all industries.
If we scale the productivity process Atj by
1 − ωj
¡
1 − βj (1 − αj)
¢
βj (1 − αj)





. Under this scaling, we prove the following proposition.
19Proposition 6 For any αj,βj,ωj ∈ (0,1), the invariant distribution of ﬁrm sizes
has thinner tails than the Pareto distribution with coeﬃcient one. Other things equal,
if αj >α k, the invariant distribution of ﬁrms in sector j has thinner tails than the
invariant distribution of ﬁrms in sector k.
Proof. The ﬁrst claim is immediate form the discussion above. To see the second, for
each α denote the unique invariant probability measure of ﬁrm sizes (see Proposition
4) by λα : LN → [0,1], where LN denotes the Borel σ−algebra associated with
LN, with associated transition function Qα and operator T∗

























































and hence λαk is not the invariant distribution αk, and the operator T∗
αj maps the λαk
into distributions with thinner left tails. The case for intermediate and high lnn are
analogous.
In this section, we established that the process of accumulating industry speciﬁc
human capital alone is suﬃcient to generate many observed properties of ﬁrm size
dynamics and ﬁrm size distributions. In particular, mean reversion in the stock of
industry speciﬁc human capital will cause small ﬁrms to grow faster than large ﬁrms
and exit rates of ﬁrms to decline with size. Moreover we were also able to establish
that the invariant distribution of ﬁrm sizes would have thinner tails than the Pareto
distribution with coeﬃcient one.
20As a consequence of using the accumulation of industry speciﬁc human capital to
explain scale dependence, our theory also predicts that the degree of scale dependence
varies with the physical capital intensity of the industry. In Section 4 below we
examine this implication in US data. Before turning to the data, the next section
establishes that these implications are robust to a number of diﬀerent modelling
assumptions that were adopted above either for simplicity or expositional reasons.
3. ROBUSTNESS OF THE MECHANISM
In the introduction we argued that it is essential that any proposed explanation for
the documented patterns in ﬁrm dynamics and size distribution be robust to the wide
variety of diﬀerences in institutions and market structures for which these patterns
have been observed. In this section, we establish that the mechanism described above
in a particular setup survives generalization to environments in which the speciﬁcation
of ﬁrm costs are diﬀerent, to the introduction of ﬁrm level heterogeneity, to alternative
mechanisms for the accumulation of human capital such as learning by doing, and to
an environment in which competition amongst ﬁrms is monopolistic. In each case, we
show how the general pattern of mean reversion in industry speciﬁc human capital
stocks leads to mean reversion in ﬁrms sizes.
3.1 Firm Costs
The basic mechanism of our paper relies on mean reversion in the stock of industry
speciﬁc human capital of production. Mean reversion in turn leads to the mean
reverting characteristics that we emphasized for ﬁrm dynamics and size distributions.
Nothing about this argument depends upon the qualitative relationship between the
relative stock of factors, and the relative size of the ﬁrm. In the model presented
above, we assumed for simplicity that the ﬁrms cost structure combined decreasing
returns to scale with a ﬁxed cost denominated in terms of the ﬁrm’s output. This
combination implied that the output of the ﬁrm was constant, so that ﬁrms reduced
employment (and hence size in terms of employment) when the stock of speciﬁch u m a n
capital grew. In other words, reversion to the mean in the stock of speciﬁcf a c t o r s
from above, produces reversion to the mean in ﬁrm sizes from below.
21Changes in the speciﬁcation of the cost structure have the potential to reverse the
qualitative relationship between factor supplies and ﬁrm size. To see this, assume as
before that each ﬁrm in industry j at time t produces output according to equation
(5). Now, however, assume that ﬁxed costs depend on the average number of workers
hired in industry j at time t, ¯ ntj. In particular, assume that ﬁxed costs are given
by Fj¯ n
ξj
tj. We have in mind institutional or organizational costs (for example dealing
with unions or other industry organizations) that depend on the average size of ﬁrms
in the industry. Individual ﬁrms do not take into account the eﬀect of their hiring
decisions on the ﬁxed costs, so the problem of the ﬁrm is identical to the one presented





ytj − rtjktj − stjhtj − wtjntj − Fj¯ n
ξj
tj,
where rtj,s tj,w tj denote the corresponding factor prices. We assume that 0 ≤ ξj < 1
and so if ξj =0w eh a v et h es a m ec a s es t u d i e da b o v e .T a k i n gﬁrst order conditions




ytj = Fj¯ n
ξj
tj.
Now output changes with the average level of employment in the industry and, since
in equilibrium all ﬁrms are identical, also with the employment level of the ﬁrm. Given
this symmetry, equilibrium in factor markets implies that the size of the typical ﬁrm






















This equation is analogous to the case considered above with a pure ﬁxed cost.
The main diﬀerences are that now both employment and output respond to changes
in factor supplies.7 Moreover, the direction of the change can diﬀer: for ξj <γ j,
the behavior of employment is as before, declining with the industry physical and
human capital stocks; for ξj >γ j this pattern is reversed and the size of ﬁrms
7Notice that because the ﬁxed costs entail an external cost, the equilibrium will not be Pareto
optimal. However, one can set up a pseudo-social planner problem that yields the same aggregate
implications than the problem discussed in the Section 2 (see also Section 3.4).
22depends positively on the stock of both types of capital but negatively with industry
employment. In either case, the main properties for ﬁrm growth and exit rates, and
the size distribution, are preserved: regardless of whether ﬁrms in industries with
large human capital stocks are large or small they revert to the mean. The example
illustrates that the necessary property of ﬁrm sizes is that they respond monotonically
to the stock of human capital in the industry. The direction of this response is not
important: in the case where ξj >γ j, reversion to the mean in the stock of speciﬁc
factors from above, produces reversion to the mean in ﬁrm sizes from above.M e a n
reversion in the stock of human capital then leads to the same arguments and results
we presented above.
3.2 Within Industry Firm Heterogeneity
In the theory presented above, we abstracted from heterogeneity amongst ﬁrms
within an industry in order to focus our attention on heterogeneity across industries.
This allowed us to emphasize the contribution of the accumulation of industry speciﬁc
human capital to the evolution of ﬁrm sizes. Clearly, there exist diﬀerences in ﬁrm
sizes even within narrowly deﬁned industries. While this may be caused by aggrega-
tion (data is rarely available beyond the three or four digit SIC levels), it is probable
that some ﬁrm speciﬁc heterogeneity remains. In this section we demonstrate how
ﬁrm speciﬁc heterogeneity can be added to our framework, and show that it does
not change the key empirical implications of our theory for the diﬀerences in ﬁrm
dynamics and size distributions across industries.
Consider the model of Section 2, where we suppress time and industry subscripts.
Suppose that after having decided to produce in a period (that is, after paying the
ﬁxed cost F)e a c hﬁrm i ∈ [0,µ] observes a ﬁrm speciﬁcp r o d u c t i v i t ys h o c kzi. This
shock is assumed to be i.i.d. over time, ﬁrms and industries within a sector. After
observing this shock, the ﬁrm i c a nt h e nh i r el a b o rni and industry-j-speciﬁc physical,














To see how this aﬀe c t st h er e s u l t s ,w ec o n s i d e ro n c ea g a i nt h es o c i a lp l a n n e r s
problem. To begin, suppose that the planner has decided that there are µ ﬁrms in
23the industry employing N workers. The amounts of industry speciﬁc physical and
human capital are ﬁxed at K and H. The planner then observes the identities of the
ﬁrms that receive each productivity shock. The problem of the planner is then to

























We assume that we can index the productivity shock by the unit interval with density
φ and that the appropriate Law of Large Numbers holds for continua of i.i.d. random
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That is, ﬁrms within an industry with a higher shock use more of both inputs and
produce more output. Actual amounts used in each ﬁrm can be determined from the





















With these results, we can characterize the level of output in the industry given
the initial choice of the number of ﬁrms µ, the choice of labor N, and previously
























From this equation, it is easy to see that the form of the industry production function
is exactly the same as for the original problem, and consequently that the choices of
N and µ, as well as investment in both types of capital, are analogously determined.
Clearly, the addition of an i.i.d. productivity shock has no eﬀect on the mean
growth and exit rates of ﬁrms in that industry. Consequently, the model has the
same implications for growth and exit at the sector level. Further, the distribution
of average ﬁrm sizes is unchanged, and so the relationship between factor intensities
and the shapes of the ﬁrm size distribution is unchanged. One implication that can
be aﬀected is the range of cases under which Zipf’s Law exactly holds: when the
conditions of Proposition 3 hold, we observe Zipf’s Law for average ﬁrm sizes, but
only for actual ﬁrm sizes if either all ﬁrms are identical within an industry, or if the
distribution within an industry is also Pareto with coeﬃcient one. We might think
of the latter as being produced by a similar mechanism as the one laid out in this
paper, working through ﬁrm speciﬁc human capital.
3.3 Learning-by-Doing Externalities
In the model of Section 2, we assumed that human capital accumulation required
some industry speciﬁc inputs. The dependence on industry-speciﬁc inputs was im-
portant for our model, as it allows human capital accumulation to vary with output
in the industry, and is the primary source of mean reversion at the industry level.
In that model, the inputs to learning were purchased by consumers, and the re-
sulting level of human capital was rented out by consumers, so that there was no
externality. An alternative assumption that has similar eﬀects is the assumption that






which states that the higher is output in the industry, the higher is accumulation of
human capital. Importantly, this involves no resource cost to the economy. Suppose
also that production occurs according to








so human capital operates exactly like labor augmenting technological progress.
Although we can no longer use the social planners problem to solve for equilibrium
allocations in this model, but we can use a pseudo-planner problem to solve it as we do
in Subsection 3.4. Similar reasoning then produces an expression for the normalized
rate of the growth of the ﬁrm of
lnnt+1 − lnnt = n
C − αj (1 − ωj)lnnt − (1 − αj)lnAt+1,
where nC again denotes a constant speciﬁc to this formulation. If there is no learning
by doing, or ωj =1 , there is no mean reversion in human capital stocks, and ﬁrm
growth rates satisfy Gibrat’s Law. As before, increases in the capital intensity of an
industry increase the rate of mean reversion in ﬁrm sizes.
This extension emphasizes that it is not industry speciﬁch u m a nc a p i t a lper se,b u t
rather the sensitivity of current production decisions to past output in the industry,
that is important for our results on mean reversion. This is important in the light
of recent research by Kambourov and Manovskii (2002) who argue that there is little
evidence for industry-speciﬁc human capital in individual earnings data8. However,
this evidence is consistent with industry-speciﬁc learning-by-doing externalities where
individual workers do not appropriate the returns to industry-speciﬁc human capital.
3.4 Monopolistic competition
The previous model uses an extremely simple theory of the ﬁrm to derive conclu-
sions on the size distribution of ﬁrms. In this section we use a diﬀerent theory of the
ﬁrm to show that the conclusions derived above are not speciﬁct ot h a tp a r t i c u l a r
theory of the organization of production in ﬁrms. For this we use the Dixit-Stiglitz
monopolistic competition model with taste for variety. In this model substitution for
varieties in the same industry limits demand for a particular variety in an industry
8Our model makes no distinction between workers within an industry, and so cannot distinguish
between industry-speciﬁc human capital and the occupation-speciﬁc human capital emphasized by
Kambourov and Manovskii (2002).
26and therefore determines the size of the ﬁrm. The model includes naturally the two
margins we have emphasized so far, the number of ﬁr m si na ni n d u s t r ya n dt h es i z eo f
these ﬁrms. We need a version of this theory where both margins react to factor ac-
cumulation. In particular, a theory that includes the three factors that we introduced
in the model above. Now, physical and human capital are speciﬁc to an industry but
mobile across varieties within that industry.
3.4.1 Households.–
As above, we assume that there are J industries divided into sectors with similar
technologies. Now, however, we assume that each industry consists of a continuum
of potential varieties which we index by  . Households provide labor and industry-
speciﬁc( b u tnot variety-speciﬁc) physical and human capital to each variety within an
industry. Output of each variety D 
tj is combined by the household using a constant
elasticity of substitution production function with parameter σj > 1 to produce a
composite industry good that is used for investment in human capital and as an
input to production of a ﬁnal good (in combination with the composite goods of
other industries) that is consumed and invested in physical capital.
That is, the problem of a consumer is to purchase goods and accumulate industry































































for all t and all j, where Etj is total demand for the ﬁnal good from industry j, and
27Qtj i st h ea m o u n to ft h eﬁnal good in industry j used to produce consumption and
physical capital investment in combination with the goods in other industries. The
consumer takes as given the prices of intermediate inputs and factors, as well as the
range of varieties of goods available.
In order to solve the ﬁrms problem below, it is useful to record that the ﬁrst order
conditions of the consumers problem with respect to a variety implies a demand for























where Ωtj i st h em e a s u r eo fv a r i e t i e st h a tm a k ep o s i t i v ep r o ﬁts and therefore produce
in equilibrium in industry j at time t, which consumers take as given.
3.4.2 Firms and industry equilibrium.–
A ﬁrm producing a variety   use a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas tech-
nology with labor, physical, and human capital as factors of production, given by











We suppress the time and industry subscripts whenever this does not lead to confu-
sion. The ﬁrst stage of the problem of the ﬁrm is to minimize costs,
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where D  is the quantity demanded of the variety and F is a ﬁxed cost of production.
The cost function of the problem then becomes







β (1 − α)
¶β(1−α) µ
w
(1 − β)(1− α)
¶(1−β)(1−α)
.
Notice that average costs C (r,s,w,D ,F j)/D  are a decreasing function of D .
28The second stage of the ﬁrm problem is to maximize proﬁts
Π(r,s,w,F)=m a x
p 
D  (p )p  − C (r,s,w,D  (p ),F),
where D  (p ) is derived from the consumers problem and stated above.
The ﬁrst order conditions of the ﬁrm problem then imply that p  = λσ/(σ − 1).
H e n c ei ne q u i l i b r i u mt h el e v e l so fp r o d u c t i o na n dp r o ﬁts by ﬁrms are given by









Zero proﬁts then implies that the number of varieties (or ﬁrms since only one ﬁrm
produces each variety) is given by Ω = E/(σFλ) and so
D  (p )=F (σ − 1).



















Output in the industry is given by







Notice that this function is constant returns to scale, with TFP given by a function
of the elasticity of substitution.
T h es i z eo fﬁrms in terms of employees is given by









which has a very similar form to the one derived for the case of perfect competition
above. As a result, the model has identical implications for the dynamics and size
distribution of ﬁrm sizes.
293.4.3 Capital accumulation, labor allocation and ﬁrm sizes.–
All that remains is to calculate the accumulation decisions of agents. Although this
can be done directly from the agents decision problem, it is instructive to compute
them in an analogous way to the allocations for the perfectly competitive economy
discussed above. Although the welfare theorems do not hold for this economy, the
fact that the markup of these monopolistic ﬁrms is constant combined with the log-
linearity of the model means that the equilibrium allocations can be obtained as the
solution of an equivalent optimum problem that is identical to the social planners
problem used above, except that the resource constraint is now















for all t and j (see Chapter 18 of Stokey, Lucas and Prescott (1989) for another
example of this pseudo-economy approach). As before, the solution of this model
has the household accumulating a ﬁxed proportion of the output of each industry
to produce investment in physical and human capital. The allocation of labor to
work in each industry is ﬁxed at the same levels as before. From these results it is
straightforward to show that the evolution of ﬁrm sizes in the model with monopolistic
competition is identical (with γ =1 ) to the evolution of ﬁrm sizes in the model with
perfect competition. In particular, analogues of Propositions 1, 3, 4, and 6 and of
Corollary 2 continue to hold.
4. EVIDENCE ON SCALE DEPENDENCE BY SECTOR
The model above has several empirical implications that are consistent with ﬁndings
in the empirical literature. Firm growth and exit rates decline with size, and the size
distribution has thinner tails than the Pareto with shape coeﬃcient one. On top of
this, in our theory the degree of reversion to the mean in human capital stocks, and
therefore in ﬁrms sizes, increases with the degree of diminishing returns in human
capital, or equivalently decreases with the degree of diminishing returns in physical
capital. A very low physical capital share implies a high human capital share, hence
a low degree of diminishing returns in human capital and, therefore, a low degree of
reversion to the mean in ﬁrm sizes. As the physical capital share increases from zero
30the degree of diminishing returns in human capital increases as does the reversion
to the mean in ﬁrm sizes. This implication of the model implies that the degree of
m e a nr e v e r s i o ni ng r o w t hr a t e s ,t h ed e g r e eo fs c a l ed e p e n d e n c ei ne x i tr a t e s ,a n d
the thinness of the tails of the size distribution, are intrinsically determined by the
importance of industry speciﬁc physical capital in technology. In this section we
contrast this implication with the data.
4.1 Data
We have investigated the variation in scale dependence across sectors using data
on growth rates and the distribution of ﬁrm sizes. We use two data-sets constructed
especially for us by the US Census Bureau. The ﬁrst is a data-set from the Statistics
of US Businesses (SUSB) program on establishment size distributions by sector at
the two digit SIC level for 1990 and three digit NAICS level for 2000. These data are
constructed from a number of sources including the annual County Business Proﬁle
(CBP) data ﬁles. The second data-set, from the Business Information Tracking Sys-
tem (BITS), contains data on growth rates of establishments between 1990 and 2000,
and deaths of establishments by size category for 1995-1996. These new data sets
have several advantages for our purposes in comparison with the publicly available
data sources. First, they provide the number of ﬁrms per size category for the ﬁnest
size categories that the US Census will release given the conﬁdentiality restrictions.
Because of our emphasis on the shape of the size distribution, this level of detail is
crucial. Previous analysis of the size distribution of ﬁrms have, to our knowledge,
used data for much larger size bins or only for a couple of sectors. Second, it includes
all sectors in the private non-farm US economy, including both manufacturing and
services. This is important for our study given that we want to understand the ef-
fect of sectoral diﬀerences in physical capital shares on the size distribution of ﬁrms.
Variations in physical capital shares are much larger across service and manufactur-
ing sectors than within them. Third, the data refers to establishment sizes, and not
enterprise sizes, which as we argued before is a better ﬁt for our theory. The unique
aspect of the longitudinal data-set is that it tracks the size of ﬁrms for several years,
and, for exiting ﬁrms, for three years before they exit.
We also need to calculate physical capital shares. We do this using the Bureau of
31Economic Analysis (BEA) Industry Accounts. We use data on labor costs and value
added at basic prices to construct labor shares which include human capital. We then
construct physical capital shares as one minus the labor share. This implies that the
physical capital shares we use include everything that is not classiﬁed as labor. There
are two potential problems with the physical capital shares we compute. First, the
physical capital shares include land shares. Land is not an industry speciﬁcf a c t o r ,
but as its share is usually small, this should have a negligible eﬀect on the physical
capital shares we use. Second, we are using the physical capital share in value added,
but our theory is abstracting from the use of intermediate inputs. To address the
former, we only consider industries with physical capital shares smaller than one half,
although the result are similar if we consider all sectors. To address the latter, we
also present results with physical capital shares adjusted for the share of value added
and the share of materials purchased from the same industry.
4.2 Growth Rates
We begin by examining the growth rates of surviving ﬁrms. As a ﬁrst step, consider
an example with two sectors. Educational services is a very labor and human capital
intensive sector with a physical capital share of 0.054, while manufacturing is much
more physical capital intensive with a physical capital share of 0.397.I ft h et h e o r yi s
consistent with the data, given that manufacturing is more physical capital intensive,
we should see growth rates of manufacturing ﬁrms decline faster with size than growth
rates of ﬁrms in the educational sector (Proposition 1).
Figure 5 illustrates that this is the case, and shows that the diﬀerences are very
large over a period of ten years. Not only do small ﬁrms grow faster than large ﬁrms
in both sectors, but the scale dependence is signiﬁcant for the entire range of ﬁrm
sizes. The diﬀerence between the growth rates in these two sectors increases with
ﬁrm size and is, for the largest ﬁrms, more than 40 per-cent.
This evidence is not particular to the pair of sectors in the example. We examine
next the implication of our theory that scale dependence in growth rates increases with
physical capital shares (denoted by αj) for all industries. We use data on the growth
of ﬁrms, gj, in a particular size category, xj, and estimate the following regression:
ln(1 + gj)=˜ aj +˜ blnxj +˜ eαj lnxj +˜ εtj.
































This amounts to ﬁtting an exponential trend where the parameter varies linearly
with physical capital shares by sector. We estimate this relationship using weighted
least squares to take into account the fact that there are many more ﬁrms in the
smaller size categories. We calculate the weights using data on the number of ﬁrms













˜ e −0.0965 −0.1303 −0.2638 −0.3503
Standard error 0.0273 0.0345 0.0195 0.0250
P-value 0.0004 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000
The estimate of ˜ e is presented in the ﬁrst column of Table 1. The third column of
Table 1 presents the result of a similar exercise ﬁtting a power function instead of an
exponential. Given the largest ﬁrm size in our sample, a larger (in absolute value)
coeﬃcient implies more scale dependence for all ﬁrm sizes. The results in Table 1 show
33that scale dependence increases signiﬁcantly with sectoral physical capital shares: A
doubling in the size of ﬁrms in manufacturing (αj ≈ 1/3) decreases average growth
by about 4% while in educational services (αj ≈ 0) the growth rate is roughly the
same.
As mentioned before, the physical capital shares have been calculated as 1 minus the
share of labor compensation in value added. Given that materials are an important
fraction of gross output in an industry, this may result in physical capital shares that
are too large relative to the ones in gross output. Since our theory does not include
materials, it is not designed to address this distinction. To address these concerns
we calculated the share of value added plus the share of inputs originating from the
same sector using the input-output data provided by the BEA. We then multiply
this share by the physical capital share to obtain an adjusted physical capital share.
If all intermediate inputs originated in the same sector, the original physical capital
shares would equal the adjusted physical capital shares. If the rest of the materials
used in production are homogeneous, the adjusted physical capital shares would diﬀer
from the original shares, and the adjustment is theoretically exact. In general, even
with this adjustment, we are abstracting from the eﬀects of mean reversion in human
capital stocks in other industries. However, one would expect the omission of these
eﬀects to bias our coeﬃcients toward zero. Given the statistical signiﬁcance of our
results presented in columns two and four of Table 1, we believe that this does not
undermine our empirical strategy.9 The omission of intermediate inputs from other
sectors may account for some of the unexplained variation in growth rates. Variation
across sectors in other parameters of the model, such as the share of raw labor, the
variance of productivity shocks, or the depreciation parameters, may account for some
of the unexplained variation too.
The last ten years have witnessed a substantial decline in employment among
large manufacturing establishments. A potential concern is that this may be driving
the larger scale dependence observed in these sectors. To address this concern,
we replicate the previous exercise for manufacturing and non-manufacturing sec-
tors separately. The results presented in Table 2 show that this phenomenon is
9Adjusting the physical capital shares increases the number of sectors in our sample with physical
capital shares below one-half from 44 to 52.
34not driving the results in Table 1. The point estimates for both manufacturing and
non-manufacturing are close to the ones for the whole economy. The estimates for
non-manufacturing are highly signiﬁcant as before. For manufacturing the estimates
are less precise reﬂecting the smaller variation in physical capital shares among these
sectors. This was precisely our original justiﬁcation for using all sectors in the econ-










˜ e −0.1086 −0.2159 −0.0953 −0.1282
Standard error 0.4944 0.6624 0.0274 0.0346
P-value 0.8262 0.7446 0.0005 0.0002
Our estimation of˜ b and ˜ e a s s u m e st h a tbo t hβj and ωj are constant across industries
(call these values β and ω respectively). We can then use the estimates presented in
Table 1 and 2, together with the estimates of ˜ b a n dE q u a t i o n( 1 3 )t oi n f e rv a l u e sf o r
β and ω. The estimates of ˜ b for the exercises in the ﬁrst two columns of Table 1 are:
−.23 (s.e. .01), −.24 (s.e. .01). This values imply a share of speciﬁc human capital
in labor services given by β = .29 and .35, and a share of investments in human
capital production given by 1 − ω = .33 and .35, respectively. That is, the model,
and the estimation above, imply that the share of labor services related to speciﬁc
human capital is around one third. Thus, as we have argued in this paper, the share
of speciﬁc human capital consistent with the scale dependence in ﬁrm dynamics is
very signiﬁcant. Other forms of human capital that are not industry speciﬁc, and
therefore are associated with individuals and not with an industry are, of course, not
included in this share. If some of the industry speciﬁc human capital is accumulated
through learning by doing, and therefore not appropriated by individuals as in Section
353.3., these numbers will be biased down. The inferred share of investments in human
capital production (1 − ω) is certainly reasonable given that we are using 10 year
growth rates. We replicated the same exercise for the manufacturing and service
sectors. The estimates of ˜ b for the exercises in the ﬁrst and third column of Table
2a r e :−.20 (s.e. .15)a n d−.23 (s.e. .01). This yields β = .35 and 1 − ω = .31 for
manufacturing, as well as β = .29 and 1−ω = .33 for services. Industry speciﬁch u m a n
capital is, therefore, more important in the service sector than in manufacturing and
it depreciates more slowly, although the diﬀerences are small and insigniﬁcant in light
of the imprecision of our estimates for the manufacturing sector. This is reassuring
given our assumption that both β and ω do not vary signiﬁcantly across industries.
4.3 Size Distribution of Firms
We next turn to the implication of our theory for the size distribution of ﬁrms. From
the available data we can calculate the share of ﬁrms in sector j with employment
larger than xj, which we denote by Pj. If the distribution of ﬁrm sizes is Pareto with
coeﬃcient one, or growth rates are scale independent, the relationship between lnPj
and lnxj should be linear with slope minus one. If growth rates depend negatively
on scale, the tails of the distribution are thinner than the tails of a Pareto with
coeﬃcient one, and the relationship is concave. Our theory states that the degree
of concavity should be positively related with physical capital shares (Proposition
6). A ﬁrst look at the data is presented in Figures 6 where we plot lnPj and xj for
educational services and manufacturing.
This representation of the size distribution emphasizes the degree of concavity and
makes diﬀerences between two distributions particularly clear for large ﬁrm sizes. The
diﬀerences between the distribution are also clear if we look at the density functions.
The density of ﬁrm sizes in these two sectors (with normalized means) is presented
in Figure 7. It is clear how the distribution of ﬁrm sizes in the educational sector
h a sm o r em a s sf o rv e r ys m a l la n dl a r g eﬁrms, and less mass for intermediate ﬁrms
than in the manufacturing sector. This is particularly clear for small ﬁrms in the
graph. The ﬁgure also compares these distributions with the Pareto distribution with
coeﬃcient one (that corresponds to a straight line with slope -1 in Figure 6). The
Pareto distribution with coeﬃc i e n to n eh a se v e nm o r em a s sa tt h et a i l sa n dl e s sa tt h e
36center, consistent with Proposition 6 as long as βj,ωj,(1 − αj) > 0. Both industries
have thinner tails than the benchmark, but as the theory predicts, the diﬀerence is
larger for the manufacturing sector. As emphasized in the introduction, the diﬀerences
between these distributions are economically large. If the manufacturing sector had
the same distribution as the educational sector, around 20% of the labor force in the
sector that currently works in medium size ﬁrms would need to be reallocated to ﬁrms
with less than 50 or more than 1000 employees.
























































In order to test the relationship between physical capital shares and the size dis-
tribution of ﬁrms for all sectors, we use our new data set on the size distributions
of establishments for 1990 and 2000. To examine this, we estimate the following
regression
lnPj =ˆ aj +ˆ bj lnxj + ˆ d(lnxj)
2 +ˆ eαj (lnxj)
2 +ˆ εj,
where ˆ aj and ˆ bj are industry speciﬁcc o e ﬃcients. This amounts to constraining the
quadratic term to vary linearly with the physical capital share. The model now
predicts that ˆ e should be negative and signiﬁcant. The results are presented in Table
3.
37T h ee s t i m a t eo fˆ e for 1990, in the ﬁrst column of Table 3, is negative and strongly
signiﬁcant. We also estimated the same regression using NAICS three digit sectors in
2000. The physical capital shares used in this regression are not as trustworthy as the
ones in 1990 given that we had to convert the data available for 2000 from the BEA
to this industry classiﬁcation system. Even with this problem, the results presented
in the second column of Table 3 show that the estimate of ˆ e is smaller in absolute
value but still negative and strongly signiﬁcant. The results with adjusted physical
capital shares are presented in the third column of Table 3, which further conﬁrms the
empirical signiﬁcance of the mechanism in our theory. As for growth rates the results
are similar when we use the sub-samples of manufacturing and non-manufacturing
sectors.
Table 3
1990 2000 1990 (adjusted)
ˆ e −0.0776 −0.0352 −0.0580
Standard error 0.0069 0.0019 0.0074
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
4.4 Exit Rates
Our mechanism, which emphasizes mean reversion in stocks of speciﬁcf a c t o r s ,
when combined with particular assumptions on preferences, also implies that exit
rates should decline with ﬁrm size. Furthermore, the rate of decline should vary with
physical capital shares. Figure 8 illustrates this using BITS data for US manufacturing
and educational services in 1995-1996. The dashed lines represent exit rates in 1995-
1996 by establishment size category. The thin solid lines represent the exit rates in
1995 by 1994 size category, and the dark line by 1992 size class. The number of ﬁrm
deaths is divided by the number of surviving ﬁrms to compute exit rates.
For ﬁrms with more than 50 employees the theory does well. Exit rates decline
clearly faster with size for manufacturing than for educational services. Overall, the
exponential trend in manufacturing is steeper than in educational services, although
the diﬀerence is small given the large variance (a rate of decline of −0.0379 for man-
38ufacturing and −0.0364 for educational services).10 The results hold more strongly
across all sectors in the economy, especially if we focus on the size distribution of ex-
iting ﬁr m st h r e ey e a r sb e f o r et h e ye x i t .T h er e a s o nw eb e l i e v et h i si st h eb e s tt e s tf o r
our theory is that it reduces exit produced purely by selection. We run the following
regression
ln(1 + ERj)=ˇ aj +ˇ blnxj + ˇ eαj lnxj +ˇ εtj,
which amounts to estimating an exponential relationship between exit rates and sizes
three years before exit.






















Educational Services Exit Year
Educational Services Exit Year - 1
Educational Services Exit Year - 3
Manufacturing Exit Year
Manufacturing Exit Year - 1
Manufacturing Exit Year - 3
The results are presented in Table 4. The ﬁrst two columns present the weighted
least squares results with weights given by the total number of ﬁrms in the representa-
tive size category, for both unadjusted and adjusted physical capital shares. The last
two columns present results from the same exercise using a power function instead of
an exponential. The results are consistent with our theory: All of the estimates are
negative and signiﬁcant. The results are also economically signiﬁcant: A doubling of
10Orr (1974), Gorecki (1976), Hause and Du Rietz (1984) and MacDonald (1986) found that ﬁrm
exit rates were negatively related to measures of physical capital intensity by industry. Given that
these studies do not distinguish among ﬁrms with diﬀerent sizes, the negative relationship may be
the result of the dependence predicted by our theory. This would be the case if ﬁrms in physical
capital intensive sectors are larger on average.
39ﬁrm size decreases exit rates by around 0.3% in manufacturing while exit rates do
not decline with size in educational services.
Table 4
1995 Exit Rates by Size in 1992
Exponential Power
(adjusted) (adjusted)
ˇ e −0.0092 −0.0164 −0.0136 −0.0233
Standard error 0.0009 0.0011 0.0013 0.0016
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have constructed a theory that is consistent with some well known
facts on scale dependence in ﬁrm dynamics and ﬁrm size distributions. The mecha-
nism emphasizes the role of the accumulation of industry speciﬁc human capital. We
have shown that this mechanism is robust to institutional and economic diﬀerences
across sectors and countries. We claim that the ubiquitous presence of these facts has
to be the result of a mechanism that is present in a variety of circumstances. The
central role of accumulation of industry speciﬁc human capital in the theory led us to
focus on cross sectoral diﬀerences in the importance of human, and therefore physical,
capital in production, and in particular physical capital intensity. Increases in the
importance of industry speciﬁc physical capital lead to an increase in the degree of
diminishing returns in human capital, and hence more scale dependence in growth,
exit rates, and ﬁrm size distributions. Since it was the theory that guided our focus
on this particular dimension of the data, the available evidence in the empirical lit-
erature is only indirect. Consequently, we take this prediction to the data and show
that it is a surprisingly good description for the cross-section of US sectors.
Our theory implies that exit rates should decline with size. Conversely, it implies
that entry rates should increase with size. The model’s implications on exit rates are
consistent with the empirical evidence. However, entry rates do not seem to increase
40with size; new entrants start their businesses at a small scale. On the one hand, it is
puzzling that a theory that does a good job in explaining many related phenomena
is not successful in this particular dimension. On the other, we built a theory under
the strong assumption that entry is frictionless: a strong assumption especially if we
look at ﬁrm sizes in their ﬁrst year of existence. Detailed longitudinal data on entry
and exit may shed light on whether looking at size several years after entry eliminates
this mismatch.
I nt h ei n t r o d u c t i o nw ec o m m e n t e do nd i ﬀerent studies that have emphasized ﬁnan-
cial as well as other types of frictions. What we show in this paper is that even though
these frictions may be important for entry, they are not needed to generate any of the
other empirical observations. This points to frictions in entry that might be alleviated
with particular policies. It is important, however, that these policies do not inter-
fere with the growth and exit of existing ﬁrms; processes that are well described by
our eﬃcient economy. Our results are, in general, not sensitive to government policies
that aﬀect ﬁrms independently of their size. Scale dependent policies may aﬀect some
of our implications and Restuccia and Rogerson (2004) argue that scale dependent
policies may have large eﬀects on eﬃciency. International evidence on ﬁrms dynamics
and the size distribution of ﬁrms, when combined with our benchmark, could shed
some light on the empirical signiﬁcance of scale dependent policies.
By emphasizing the accumulation of speciﬁc human capital, our theory also makes
predictions for the future evolution of the ﬁrm size distribution. The ongoing spe-
cialization of developed economies in services will have important consequences on
ﬁrm sizes and ﬁrm dynamics. Our theory predicts that this will lead to a more dis-
persed distribution of ﬁrm sizes, where we will see more small and more very large
ﬁrms. These arguments suggest that we are moving towards an economy in which
the dominance of large ﬁrms in some industries, like Walmart, will coexist increas-
ingly with large numbers of small ﬁrms in diﬀerent industries within the same sector,
like bakeries or tailors. This trend is the natural result of the eﬃcient division of an
industry’s production among ﬁrms.
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